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in order to determine whether a given shipment could leave the
place of manufacture.21 The shipment of an article would neces-
sitate an inquiry as to whether any of its component parts were
the products of child labor. Similar practical difficulties would
be encountered in the labeling of goods produced with child labor.
In view of these rather apparent defects, the alternative leg-
islation would appear to be a poor substitute for the proposed
Amendment. As an improvement on present conditions, it de-
serves support. The Child Labor Amendment, however, would
concentrate control, simplify procedure, and unify requirements
so as to escape the above objections to the alternative legislation.
It is submitted that a comparison between the two suggested
solutions discloses the alternative legislation to be an unneces-
sarily intricate and comparatively ineffective method of settling
the problem of child labor.
FRED L. KUHLMANN.
EFFECT OF ADVERTISING ON THE MANFACTURER'S LIABILITY
"Look for the big red letters on the package." Advertisements
by radio, newspaper, circulars, and labels today comprise the
method of inducing the public to purchase commodities by
brands and trade names. Advertising has had a tremendous
growth since 1900. Thirty-seven years ago a full page advertise-
ment aroused fears for the solvency of a company., Today mil-
lions of dollars are spent on advertising. The economic results
have been the extension of modern research and mass produc-
tion. The legal problem is whether the manufacturer has been
made to bear responsibility in proportion to the benefits reaped
by his advertising.
Under present day conditions the consumer is dependent upon
remote producers. 2 Business has become more and more complex
under modern marketing conditions, until, it would seem today,
21. Mr. Corwin suggests that this type of cooperative action will make
it possible for the federal government to use state officials in the enforce-
ment of its law. This would eliminate the duplication of effort on the part
of federal and state officials.
Ibid. 1. c. 604, 610, 612 f. n. 52.
The practicability of such a proposal is, however, questionable. Certain
states are definitely opposed to the proposed restrictions on child labor.
Efficient enforcement of the law by the officials of such a state could not be
expected.
1. Wn. T. Nardin, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 19, 1937, p. 133:4.
2. Vold, Sales (1931) 476.
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that social justice demands a relaxation of the old rule of caveat
emptor.' The dealers of goods are tending to become mere con-
duits for the passage of goods from the manufacturer to the ulti-
mate consumer. Personal contacts between the manufacturer
and the consumer have largely disappeared. Yet the courts are
reluctant to increase the liability of the manufacturer. They are
not strict disciples of Montesquieu's theory that law should vary
with time and geography.4
The purpose of this note is to examine the various theories
advanced by the courts and legal writers in regard to the liabil-
ity of the manufacturer to persons with whom he has no privity
of contract. It is convenient to divide the manufacturer's liabil-
ity into tort liability and warranty liability. Special attention
will be paid in this note to the importance given to modern adver-
tising by the courts under these various theories of tort and war-
ranty liability.
I. MANUFACTURER'S TORT LIABILITY
A. Exceptions to Winterbottom v. Wright
The manufacturer's liability today is based chiefly upon the
principles of tort.5 The general rule as laid down by Winter-
bottom v. Wright6 is that there can be no liability placed upon
upon the manufacturer in favor of a party to whom the manu-
facturer bears no contractual relation. The basis of the rule was
the fear of courts to extend liability of the manufacturer indefi-
nitely.7 The balancing of the interests of the ultimate consumer
against the dangers involved in the extension of liability and the
possibility of spurious claims, was one of the first difficulties
which the courts had to meet.
The first exception to the rule of Winterbottom v. Wrigh7t was
laid down by the case of Thomas v. Winchester,8 in which it was
held that if a manufacturer places upon the market an immi-
nently dangerous drug, intended to protect or preserve human
3. Note, 11 N. Y. L. Rev. 615 (1933).
4. Comment, 17 Mich. L. Rev. 261 (1918).
5. For a good discussion of tort liability of the manufacturer in general
see 17 A. L. R. 709; 39 A. L. R. 1000; 63 A. L. R. 340; 88 A. L. R. 527;
Bohlen, Liability of the Manufacturer to Persons Other than His Immedi-
ate Vendee (1929) 45 L. Q. 343.
6. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
7. Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen 514 (Mass., 1866), the rule of liability
ex Contractu or ex delicto can be maintained only by a party to the contract
or there would be no limit to the liability which might be incurred.
8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); food is
under this, see Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W.
80 (1915) ; See for collection of cases, supra, note 5.
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life, then he is liable for injuries to a consumer produced by his
negligence, without regard to privity of contract. The case in-
volved a carelessly labelled drug and the defendant was held
liable despite the absence of privity of contract with the pur-
chaser, because the law imposed upon him a duty to avoid acts
dangerous to others. Another exception to the general rule was
announced in the case of Huset v. J. 1. Case Threshing Machine
Co.9 The court said that when one sells a defective article know-
ing of its defective condition, and the article is imminently dan-
gerous to life, health or property, the manufacturer is liable
without privity of contract. A third exception is that developed
in Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Car Co.,10 in which the court re-
fers to articles which are "inherently dangerous."
These three exceptions have led to much confusion in the court
-decisions and to many ridiculous consequences. Some of the
courts became confused as to what to consider imminently dan-
gerous. One line of decisions holds that the article must be immi-
nently dangerous in and of itself.1' Others say that it is sufficient
if the article is imminently dangerous because of negligent manu-
facture. 2
Sanborn, J., in the Huset case classified articles such as food,
,drink, explosives and firearms as imminently dangerous.13 Here
the courts have become involved in a matter of interpretation
and construction. They have differed as to whether chewing
tobacco is a food, and thus whether the manufacturer was liable
-for teeth broken by foreign substances in the tobacco.14
The tendency of the courts is to extend the exception of the
Huset case to cases in which the manufacturer had not know-
ingly sold a defective article but was merely negligent in failing
9. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8,
1903); Kolash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 88 Col. Dec. 62, 34 P. (2d) 481
(1934) (defective rung in ladder).
10. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050
(1916); Supra, note 6; Kotch v. Buick Motor Car Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193
N. E. 529 (1934); Morris v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemour, 68 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 8, 1934) ; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W.
'855 (1932); Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S. W. 635 (1919).
11. Kuellog v. Rodderick Leon Mfg. Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1903);
Bohlen, Liability of the Manufacturer to Persons Other than His Immedi-
,ate Vendee (1929) 45 L. Q. 343, classifies this as an untenable distinction.
12. See 17 A. L. R. 709.
13. Bohlen, Liability of the Manufacturer to Persons Other than His
Immediate Vendee (1929) 45 L. Q. 343.
14. Liggett Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W.
1009 (1915) held not a food; to the same effect, Corum v. R. J. Reynolds,
205 N. C. 213, 171 S. E. 78 (1933); cf. Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
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to discover the defect. They have extended the rule of the Mac
Pherson case to articles not inherently dangerous. 15 A shoe with
a defective heel,16 and a bed with defective slats,17 have been held
not inherently dangerous while a sanitary napkin with a pin con-
cealed in it"' has been held to be inherently dangerous. Soap con-
taining poisonl', has been considered inherently dangerous, but a
bar of soap containing a needle 0 not inherently dangerous. A
pop bottle which explodes has been considered both inherefttly
dangerous in one case and not so in another case in the same
jurisdiction.21
It would seem that the courts do not consider the social prob-
lem implicit in these cases, viz., whether the risk of loss should
be shifted from the consumer to the manufacturer, who is better
able to bear it. Instead courts flounder with the question whether
an article is inherently or imminently dangerous, with frequent
confusion and ridiculous results.
The courts are inclined to construe the rule of liability of the
manufacturer liberally when food is concerned. The courts may
treat improperly prepared food as inherently dangerous to hu-
man life. 2 A frequent statement is that the manufacturer owes
the public a duty to see to it that he does not endanger the lives
and health of the community by putting unwholesome food on
the market, 8 or as it is tersely put in Catani v. Swift,24 the duty
of the manufacturer is absolute. In Weiser v. Holzman," the
court laid down the rule that the liability of the manufacturer
does not rest upon contract but rather upon the original act of
15. 3 Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) sec. 498.
16. Cook v. Garside, 259 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1932).
17. Field v. Empire, 166 N. Y. Supp. 509 (1917).
18. La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 226 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1928).
19. Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W. 576 (Tex., 1912).
20. Hasbrook v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (1909).,
21. Note, 21 Ky. L. Rev. 398, 399 (1932); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Shelton, 214 Ky. 218, 282 S. W. 778 (1926) (dangerous); cf. Stone v. Van
Noy News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W. 1092 (1913).
22. Holy v. Swift & Co., 152 Wis. 570 (1913); Boyd v. Coca Cola Co.,
132 Tenn. 23, 29 (1914) : "Practically all modern cases are to the effect that
the ultimate consumer of food, medicines, and beverages may bring his
action directly against the manufacturer for injuries caused by negligent
preparation." Doyle v. Continental Baking Co., 262 Mass. 516, 160 N. E.
325 (1928); Tomilson v. Armour, 75 N. J. L. 748,- 70 Atl. 314 (1907);
Whistle Bottling Co. v. Searson, 207 Ala. 387, 92 So. 657 (1922); Liggett
Meyers v. Wallace, 69 S. W. (2d) 857, (Tex., 1934) where a plug of to-
bacco containing metal was inherently dangerous.
23. Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 24 Ga. 121 (1905); Crigger v.
Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915).
24. Catani v. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, 62, 95 AtI. 931 (1915).
25. Weiser v. Holzman, 33 Wash. 87, 73 Pac. 797 (1903).
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delivery of the article. If the food is unwholesome, the manu-
facturer must be liable for the natural consequences of his act.
Advertising plays its part under these exceptions to the rule
requiring privity; and a manufacturer has been held liable for
failure to warn the consumer, by means of labels or advertise-
ments, of the dangers involved in the use of his products. Lia-
bility may be imposed for negligent advertising. The failure to
warn by label of the danger of deterioration of powdered milk if
not properly cared for,28 or of the danger of oil in lamps,27 has
rendered the manufacturer liable. If the advertising itself is
considered negligent the manufacturer will be held. Thus a false
description on a package of sparklers that they were harmless, 2
and the improper advertising of toy guns as harmless, has made
the manufacturer liable for injuries sustained by children.29 As-
surances by a manufacturer that a gasoline stove was perfectly
safe founded the liability of the manufacturer for an explosion
of the stove.30 In E. I. Dupont de Nemours case31 it was stated
that the manufacturer owes a duty to those who rely upon his
advertisements and must exercise reasonable care in regard to
his advertising or take the consequences. In Marsk v. Ursc
Har'dware3 2 the manufacturer had sent out circulars in which it
was stated that certain gun powder might safely be handled in
every way. It exploded while being tamped into the ground, and
the manufacturer was held liable. These cases of negligent ad-
vertising should not be confused with the deceit cases following.
B. The Deceit Theory
The court may in considering advertising put the manufac-
turer's liability upon the ground of deceit. The problem then
arises whether the advertising constitutes a respresentation of
fact or a mere puffing statement.33 The courts are very reluctant
to permit the action of deceit. It is well settled, however, that the
representations in deceit may be made to a class.3 ' It has been
held that an advertisement of a heat control device, that it "func-
26. Rosenbush v. Ambrosia Mills Co., 168 N. Y. Supp. 505 (1917).
27. Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870).
28. Henry v. Crook, 195 N. Y. Silpp. 642 (1922).
29. Crest v. Art Metal Co., 243 N. Y. Supp. 469 (1930).
30. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 147 S. E. 119 (Ga. App., 1929).
31. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Baridon, 73 F. (2d) 26, (C. C. A. 8,
1934).
32. Marsk v. Ursk Hardware, 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913).
33. Handler False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 Yale L. J. 22.
34. Leonard v. Springer, 197 Ill. 532, 64 N. E. 199 (1902); Note, 9 Cor-
nell L. Q. 187 (1924).
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tioned with precision unequalled," was mere dealer's talk, and
that the manufacturer was not liable because the dealer was un-
able to sell the articleY5 In Graham v. John Watts"3 a farmer
had purchased clover seed which was incorrectly labelled alfalfa.
The court here was confronted with the Biblical maxim, "what-
soever a man soweth that shall he also reap." The wholesaler
was held liable for false representations.
In the food cases the courts are very strict in their construc-
tion of the advertisement. In the leading case of Newhall v.
Ward7 representations on the wrapper of a loaf of bread that
it was "100% pure, healthful and nutritious" and contained spe-
cific ingredients was considered to refer only to the absence of
such deleterious substances as would constitute adulterations and
not to refer to such foreign substances as a nail in the bread.
Such an interpretation precluded the action of deceit. In Alpine
Brothers v. Freund,;' a label stating that "the bread is made un-
der ideal conditions, of the best materials and by expert bread-
makers," was held not to represent that foreign substances would
under no conditions be found in the loaf.
Before the court will permit the action of deceit the consumer
must rely upon the manufacturer's advertisements, as in the An-
heuser Busch case39 where the consumer bought drugs relying on
the advertisements that the mixture was "healthful and harm-
less." The consumer may hold the dealer liable in an action of
deceit if he can establish the elements therof,'3 unless it is the
manufacturer who makes the representations. 41 The difficulty
with the deceit action is that reliance is hard to prove, the parol
evidence rule proves embarrassing, and the puffing doctrine is
hard to circumvent. 42 Also the almost impossible task of proving
scienter confronts the injured party.43
35. James Spear Stove & Heating Co. v. General Electric Co., 12 Fed.
Supp. 977 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1934).
36. Graham v. John R. Watts & Co., 238 Ky. 96, 36 S. W. (2d) 859(1931).
37. Newhall v. Ward, 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922).
38. Alpine v. Freund Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N. E. 553 (1923).
39. Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Co., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95 (1912).
40. Boysen v. Patterson, 211 N. W. 849 (Iowa, 1927) ; Oelwein v. Baker,
214 N. W. 595 (Iowa, 1927); Brown Cracker & Candy Company v. Jensen,
32 S. W. (2d) 227 (Tex., 1930).
41. Hieronymous Motor Co. v. Smith, 241 Ky. 209, 43 S. W. (2d) 668
(1931).
42. Milton Handler, False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 Yale
L. J. 22.
43. Note, 11 N. Y. L. Rev. 615 (1933).
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C. Pure Food Laws and Advertising Statutes
As early as 1266 statutes were passed treating the sale of food
differently from the sale of other articles, in that the vendor
might be held liable without a showing of fraud.44 Some states
have passed statutes which impute negligence to the manufac-
turer if the statute is violated, and negligence is presumed when
statutory violation is shown.45 Some courts, interpreting pure
food statutes, say that the violation of the statute is not negli-
gence per'se, as the statute was not intended to make the manu-
facturer an insurer of his goods. Accordingly it is not neces-
sarily a tort if the duty imposed by the statute is violated, for
the violation is considered only as evidence of negligence, 4 and
the manufacturer may escape liability by showing that he used
every available means of care.47 The court may take the attitude
that the intent of the legislature was not to dictate a standard of
care and conduct as to torts.:8 Under the pure food laws the
courts will not consider a food as adulterated even though it be
harmful if no dangerous ingredient has been added4" and it would
even be permissible to add foreign matter as long as the dose
was such that it would not be injurious to health."
These pure food laws do not apply to advertising, yet this is
the most important means of sales promotion. People are robbed
of millions of dollars every year by false and misleading adver-
tising. "Yearly a toll of millions is taken from the sick and from
the unfortunate and ignorant by advertising."'r To prevent this
abuse statutes have been enacted to make false and misleading
44. Note, 5 Iowa L. Bul. 6, 36 (1920).
45. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 13003 et. seq.; Kelly v. John R. Dally Co., 56
Mont. 63 (1919) ; Bines v. Compron, 186 Minn. 578, 244 N. W. 72 (1932) ;
Burnette v. Augusta Coca Cola Co., 157 S. C. 359, 154 S. E. 645 (1930);
Solman v. Libby, 219 Ill. 421, 76 N. E. 582 (1906); Mesbesher v. Chan-
nelene Oil Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428 (1909); Culbertson v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930); Bourcheix v. Willow
Brook Dairy, 286 N. Y. 1, 196 N. E. 617 (1935); Armour v. Wannamaker,
202 Fed. 423, (C. C. A. 3, 1913); Kelly v. John R. Dally Co., 56 Mont. 63,
181 Pac. 326 (1916); Portage Markets v. Gearge, 111 Ohio St. Rep. 775,
146 N. E. 283 (1924) ; Bolivar v. Mannon, 238 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1929).
46. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916).
47. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934).
48. Hawson v. Foster Beef Co., 177 Atl. 656 (N. H., 1934) where the
court refuses to imply negligence in cases of violation of a pure food law
as this would be dictating a standard of conduct to a civil case which was
not the intent of the legislature.
49. Armour v. Miller, 39 Ga. 229, 147 S. E. 185 (1925).
50. United States v. Lexington Mill, 232 U. S. 399, 34 S. Ct. 337 (1914).
51. Supra, note 42.
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advertising criminal. -2 Such statutes, however, are merely of
a deterrent nature and afford no civil remedy.
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In cases in which food is bottled or packaged the courts have
worked out special rules, and today the manufacturer's liability
in these cases is a well recognized exception. The manufacturer
is not an insurer of the goods ;53 rather his liability is founded
upon negligence. A realization of the almost impossible task of
proving negligence has led many courts to apply the doctrine,
of res ipsa loquitur where a foreign substance in the food is the
cause of the injury.54
Three essentials" must be established before the res ipsa lo-
quitur doctrine is applicable: (1) that the thing causing the in-
jury was in the control of the defendant, (2) that injury would
not have happened had the defendant used care, and (3) that
52. Conn. G. S. (1930) sec. 6375; Comp. Law. Fla. 1927, sec. 7311; Ky.
St. (1930) sec. 883 e; Mass. G. S. (1923) c. 100, sec. 11; Tenn. Code (1932)
see. 11154; Wis. St. (1927) sec. 343, 413; 15 U. S. C. (1926) sec. 41-77; see
note, 17 Col. L. R. 258 (1917) ; note, 36 Yale L. J. 1155 (1927) ; Ala. Code
(1928) sec. 4133; Kan. Rev. St. Ann. (1923) c. 21, sec. 1112; Mich. Acts
(1925) sec. 319; W. Va. Code Ann. (1923) c. 145, see. 36; Wyo. Comp. St.
Ann. (1920) sec. 7302.
53. For the general rule see Birmingham Chero Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64, 17 A. L. R. 667 (1921), where the court
says the action is one of tort. Cf. Kroger Co. v. Schneider, 60 S. W. (2d)
594, 249 Ky. 261 (1933) where the court said the manufacturer is the in-
surer of the wholesomeness of food on the ground of public policy.
54. Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., 11 Fed. Supp. 994 (D. C. N. D. Old.
1935); Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1917); Ruben-
backer v. Col. Packing Corporation, 250 Mass. 198, 145 N. E. 281 (1924);
Goldman v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488; 117 AtI. 866 (1922); Davis v. Van Camp,
189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382; Rudolph v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 4 N. J.
Misc. 318, 132 Atl. 508 (1926); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P. (2d) 162 (Ariz.,
1933) ; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 143, 144 Atl. 884;
Madouros v. Kan. City Coca Cola Co., 90 S. W. (2d) 445 (Mo., 1936);
Hackman v. St. Louis Dairy, 90 S. W. (2d) 177 (Mo., 1936); Merriman v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 68 S. W. (2d) 149 (Tenn., 1933); Reichart Milling
Co. v. George, 162 So. 393 (Ala., 1934); Goldman & Fireman Bottling Co.
v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866 (1922); Richenbacker v. California
Packing Co., 250 Mass. 198, 145 N. E. 281 (1924); O'Brien v. Louis Ky.
Ligget Co., 282 Mass. 438, 185 N. E. 28 (1933); Nehi Bottling Co. v.
Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930); Moore v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 178 S. E. 711 (Ga., 1935); Coleman v. Dublen Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 170 S. E. 549 (Ga. App., 1933); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Baskin, 155 So. 217 (Miss., 1934); Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola
Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 At]. 700 (1929); Carbonne v. California Packing Co.,
169 At]. 855 (N. J., 1934); Cassini v. Curtis Candy Co., 113 N. J. L. 91,
172 Atl. 519 (1934); Norfolk Coca Cola Works v. Krause, 173 S. E. 97
(Va., 1934).
55. 3 Cooley, Torts (4th ed., 1932) sec. 480.
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there is no explanation by the defendant. Those courts which
accept the doctrine have laid down definite limitations. They re-
fuse to apply the doctrine where the plaintiff is injured by food,
some of the ingredients of which were purchased from or handled
by others, on the theory that the carelessness of parties other
than the defendant might have caused the injury.60 If the food
does not reach the consumer in the original package the con-
sumer has the further burden of proving that the foreign matter
was in the food when it left the manufacturer's possession."
The inference of negligence may be overcome by the manufac-
turer's showing that he had exercised a high degree of care, had
done everything possible to guard against such an injury, and
had taken every possible mechanical precaution. 8
But some courts refuse to apply the last limitation. They will
not permit the manufacturer to escape liability by showing he
used a high degree of care. Thus in the case of Kroger Co. v.
Schneider" the court held, on the ground of public policy, that
the manufacturer should be considered an insurer of the whole-
someness of food. The court said that one manufacturing provi-
sions for domestic consumption is bound to determine at his
peril that the provisions are sound and cannot escape liability
for injury to his customers by proving extraordinary care in the
preparation of the food. Public safety demands that the plaintiff
should recover, and a mere showing of injury should be suffi-
cient to take the case to the jury. The Schneider case involved
a sale between the defendant and the consumer. But the same
rule of res ipsa oquitur should apply against a manufacturer
whose goods passed through hands of a retailer if it can be in-
ferred that the defect was in the article when the article was
prepared.60
There is conflict as to whether the doctrine is applicable when
56. Ash v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396 (1918);
Horn Hardart Baking Co. v. Lieber, 25 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 3, 1928);
Hobart v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 98 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tenn., 1936).
57. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 155 So. 217 (Miss., 1934); Merriman
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 68 S. W. (2d) 149 (Tenn., 1936).
58. Tavani v. Swift, 363 Pa. 184, 105 At]. 55 (1918), where it was a
complete defense to show trichinae could not be detected by a scientific
method. Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155(1915); Sheffer v. Willowly, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253 (1896); Crocher v.
Baltimore Dairy Lunch, 214 Mass. 177, 100 N. E. 1078; McPherson v.
Cupano, 31 Ga. App. 82, 121 S. E. 580 (1924).
59. Kroger Co. v. Schneider, 60 S. W. (2d) 594, 249 Ky. 261 (1933).
60. DeGroat v. Ward Baking Co., 102 N. 3. L. 188, 130 At]. 540 (1925);
Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1917); Minutilla v.
Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929).
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a bottle of Coca-Cola explodes.61 Here the issue turns on the
question whether the manufacturer is an insurer of the bottle as
well as of the contents.
A dealer may become liable by using his own labels and stick-
ers on the original package although he is not the manufacturer
of the goods. He may be liable for defects which are caused by
the manufacturer's negligence because he has subjected himself
to the liability of the manufacturer by using his own labels ex-
clusively.62
Some courts refuse to apply the r'es ipsa loquitur doctrine to
packaged goods. These courts hold that negligence must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence3 and that the plain-
tiff must bring his suit under the doctrine of one of the excep-
tions to Winterbottom v. Wright. Under this view the foreign
substance in the bottle does have an evidentiary value.
E. Conclusion of Negligence Theories
From the following discussion it would seem that courts are
very reluctant to extend tort liability and that there is much judi-
cial confusion in cases of negligence involving the sale of chat-
tels. The rules are more liberal as regards food, but even then
negligence must be shown, and proof of the absence of negli-
gence leaves consumer without a remedy. There is a clear need
for a remedy in cases of purely accidental injury. Because of
this need, perhaps, some courts have lately developed theories of
warranty by which the manufacturer is held liable. The difficulty
of establishing negligence and the other requirements of tort
liability requires a shift of emphasis from tort liability to war-
ranty liability.
61. Loebig v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 81 S. W. (2d) 910, 259 Ky. 124
(1935) where the res doctrine was rejected because the manufacturer was
not an insurer of the bottle. But see Taylor v. Berner, 7 N. J. Misc. 597,
146 Atl. 674 (1929); State v. Anheuser-Busch, 271 S. W. 497 (Mo., 1925).
62. Swift v. Hawkins, 164 So. 231 (Miss., 1985); Slavin v. Francis Lig-
gett Co., 114 N. J. L. 421, 177 Atl. 120 (1935).
63. King v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 352 (La., 1933);
Russos v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 161 So. 909 (La., 1935); Cheli
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 273 Mich. 536, 263 N. W. 875 (19,34); Swenson v.
Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W. 310 (1929); Contana Pro-
vision Co. v. Gardner, 130 Ohio St. Rep. 43, 196 N. E. 634 (1935); Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Jenkings, 82 S. W. (2d) 15 (Ark., 1935); Anheuser-
Busch v. Southard, 84 S. W. (2d) 89 (Ark., 1935); Dunn v. Tex. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 545 (Tex., 1935); Enloe v. Charlotte Cola
Co., 180 S. E. 582 (N. C., 1935); Blackwell v. Coca Cola Co., 182 S. E.
469 (N. C., 1935); Upton v. Harrison, 68 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 4, 1934);
Birmingham Coca Cola v. Clark, 89 So. 64 (Ala., 1921).
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IL MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY ON THE THEORY OF
WARRANTY
The doctrine of warranty has so developed that today there is
a demand for the development of a warranty action against the
manufacturer who is not in privity with the consumer. The
reasons justifying the action of warranty against the manufac-
turer may be stated as follows: (1) circuity of action, "4 (2) to
shift the risk of loss from the consumer to the manufacturer in
purely accidental injuries, and (3) to raise the standard of
care.65 The answer of the courts to these arguments is that a
swarm of petty and spurious claims would exist.0 However, it
would seem that the same danger should exist with reference to
dealer's liability for warranty. Nevertheless, the courts are re-
luctant to base the manufacturer's liability in warranty, even
though the retail dealer is today becoming a mere agent for dis-
tribution of the goods of the manufacturer.
However urgent the need for extension of liability, the general
rule today is that if there is not privity of contract there is no
warranty as regards chattels.67 The majority of the courts re-
fuse to permit implied warranties as regards food, when there
is no privity of contract. 8 The Uniform Sales Act, makes no
64. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed., 1924) 489; see Kasler v. Skavouckl, 1
K. B. 78 (1928) where there was a series of 5 recoveries over. See Willis-
ton, Necessity of Privity of Contract in Warranties, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 418
(1928) where this case is cited. There was a series of five recoveries over
and the manufacturer ultimately paid the consumer's damages and the entire
cost of litigation. Such recovery over is subject to constant failure as the
financial irresponsibility at any point along the line will defeat it. It is
even problematical whether a warranty of wholesomeness arises in favor
of the dealer so that he can recover from the manufacturer.
65. Note, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 359 (1932) ; Vold, Sales (1931) 476.
66. Llewellyn, Cases and Material on Sales (1930) at page 343 states:
"There are those that trump claims. There are those who make a business
of it. There are perjured doctors and bogus injuries. And a false claim
resting on poisoning from food stuffs, based on warranty, is hard to de-
fend."
67. Young v. Certainteed Products Corp., 35 Ga. App. 419, 133 S. E. 279(1926); Case Threshing Machine v. Dillsworth, 216 Ky. 637, 287 S. W.
994 (1926); Diamond T. Motor Co. v. Cucher, 160 At]. 41 (N. J., 1932);
Burgner Bowman Lumber Co. v. McCord, 216 Pac. 815, (Kan., 1923); Rit-
tenhouse Wintershum Auto Co. v. Kissner, 98 Atl. 301 (Md., 1916); Crocker
v. Barron, 234 S. W. 1032 (Mo. App., 1921); Maudlin v. Milford, 127 S. C.
507, 121 S. E. 547 (1924) ; Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211
Pac. 748 (1923) ; Lee v. Pauly Motor Truck Co., 179 Wis. 139, 190 S. W. 819(1922); Burris v. Baldwin Doherty Co., 170 Atl. 511 (Me., 1934); Wood
v. Advance Rumley Co., 234 N. W. 517 (N. D., 1931); Hood v. Warrance,
205 Ala. 332, 87 So. 524 (1921); Wilhauser v. Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231,
76 Atl. 271 (1910).
68. Thomason v. Ballard, 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935), where the
argument is advanced that the manufacturer is not an insurer of his
product and should be liable only in the case of negligence. Coca Cola
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distinction between food and other articles yet it is interesting
to note the liberality of some courts with respect to food.
A. Implied Warranties
Some few courts, through fictional theories, have found excep-
tions to the general rule of warranty where food is concerned.
The first food case brought on the theory of warranty in the
United States was Van Bracklin. v. Fonda.,", Since that case, the
litigation concerning food and implied warranties as regards the
manufacturer has been tremendous, but very few courts have
departed from the general rule.
In Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzano70 the court held that whatever
implied warranty arose in favor of the dealer who established
the relationship with the defendant baking company was for the
benefit of the ultimate consumer, on the theory that there existed
a contract for the benefit of a third person. This view is open to
severe logical criticism on the ground that the beneficiary was
remote and indefinite.71
In Missouri the case of Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. 72 has been considered authority for the proposition
Bottling Co. v. Hill, 90 S. W. (2d) 210 (Ark., 1936); Chysky v. Drake,
235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576, 27 A. L. R. 1533 (1923); Wilhauser v.
Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Ati. 271 (1910) ; Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass.
257, 111 N. E. 785, L. R. A. 1919 E. 1006 (1916) ; Crigger v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915) ; Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 98 S. W. (2d) 113 (Tenn., 1936); Pelletier v. Du Pont, 124 Me. 269,
128 Atl. 186 (1925); Smith v. Hanson, 238 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1930); Prinsen
v. Russos, 215 N. W. 905 (Wis., 1927); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream
Co., 144 Atl. 884, (R. I. 1929) ; Maudlin v. Milford, 127 S. C. 509, 121 S. E.
547 (1924); Dunn v. Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 545
(Tex., 1935); Casini v. Curtis Candy Co., 113 N. J. L. 91, 172 Atl. 519
(1934); Tomilson v. Armour, 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908); Nehi
Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 29 (1930); Dothan
Chero Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 638, 80 So. 734 (1918) ;
cf. Collen Baking Co. v. Savage, 155 So. 336 (Ala., 1933) which overrules
the Weeks case.
69. Von Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 John 468 (N. Y., 1815); Note, 5 Iowa L.
Bull. 6, 36 (1920).
70. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzano, 270 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 55
(1928).
71. Comment, 2 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 330 (1928); Note, 77 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 388, 392 (1928), if the beneficiary can be considered as a beneficiary
at all he must be considered as an incidental beneficiary as the contract
obviously was not for the benefit of the consumer. And it is well settled
that 3rd persons who are merely incidentally benefited by a contract have
no right of action on that contract.
72. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 90 S. W. (2d)
445 (Mo., 1936) ; In a most recent case in Missouri, Degouveia v. H. P. Lee
Mercantile Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 336 (Mo. App., 1936) the Madouros case is
recognized as an exception to the rule that the manufacturer is not liable
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that the subpurchaser is the assignee of the dealer,7 3 and there-
fore is the assignee of the benefits of the warranty. The court
said' 4 "A warranty of food is available between the parties to the
contract and not in favor of third parties unless they claim as as-
signees of the warranty." Such also was the dictum in the case
of Smith v. Carlos75 where the action was against the immediate
vendee. The basis of this view is the general rule that one who
has a right by contract may, by assigning his right, give his
assignee power to enforce it.76 However, the view has been
severely criticised on the ground that there is no contract,"7 that
the sale does not indicate the seller's intention to part with the
right of action7 8 and that the warranty must be considered as
personal to the original purchaser."
Another theory advanced is that the warranty in the sale of
food is analogous to covenants relating to real property, and that
the warranty runs with the chattel.8 0 The cases here are limited
to original package cases and it would seem the action is for an
implied warranty of quality.81 Some courts have held that by
putting the goods on the market in the original package the
manufacturer, in effect, represents to each purchaser that the
for implied warranty to third persons with whom he has no privity. And
the court in this case refuses to extend this exception of the Madouros case
further than the facts in that case saying it was not applicable in the
Lee case because the manufacturer was in a different position in the Lee
case than in the Madouros case. In the Madouros case the manufacturer
had opportunity to inspect his goods and see to it that they were fit for a
use but in this case the goods were sold to the defendant company already
sealed so that he would not have an opportunity to inspect them.
73. Comment, 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 113, 114 (1936).
74. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 90 S. W. (2d) 445,
448 (Mo., 1936).
75. Smith v. Carlos, 315 Mo. App. 488, 247 S. W. 468 (1923).
76. 1 Williston Sales (2d ed. 1924) 487.
77. Dunn v. Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 545 (Te-x.,
1934) where the court held that the resale of an article does not give a
right of action in warranty. The court looks for an offer of contract and
finds none.
78. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) 498.
79. Wood v. Advance Rumley Co., 234 N. W. 517 (N. D., 1931), where
the court said the warranty was personal to the purchaser to whom the
warranty was made and no subsequent sale will vest this in the subsequent
vendee.
80. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927)
where there was a gift of coca cola to the plaintiff who was made ill, the
court said since the gift carried with it title, the implied warranty ran
with it. See comment, 7 Miss. L. J. 203 (1913); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Brackin, 155 So. 217 (Miss. 1934).
81. Williston, Necessity of the Privity of Contract in Warranties (1928)
42 Harv. L. Rev. 414, 418.
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contents are wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which
they are sold and that this representation supplies the needed
privity.1
-2
The burden in these cases is on the plaintiff to show that the
food was unfit for consumption.8 3 The food must be used in the
usual manner and not an unusual one.8 4 There is also a conflict
in the cases as to the liability of the dealer when the goods are in
the original package' The better view would seem to be that the
dealer should not be held, as the purchaser is really relying upon
the manufacturer rather than the dealer. This holding, however,
might work hardship in those jurisdictions which do not allow
recovery against the manufacturer; for the consumer might be
wholly without remedy.8 ' If the courts limit liability to the
dealer17 there might be additional hardship in cases in which the
dealer is judgment proof.
B. Cases Confusing Tort and Warranty
There is a group of cases which fail to keep clear the distinc-
tion between tort and contract, confusing these two fields of law.
In Parks v. Pie Co."8 the court spoke of implied warranty but
said that the manufacturer is under a duty of care,8 9 and con-
cluded that he must know that food prepared by him is fit for
consumption or take the consequences. 0 In the case of Binion v.
82. Mazetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Nock v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 156 Atl. 537 (Penn., 1931); Note, 36 Dickinson L.
Rev. 106, 110 (1933); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155(1924); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 417 (1934);
Charles v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933); Parks v. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202, L. R. A. 1915C 179 (1914).
83. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Brackin, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933).
84. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934).
85. Liable-Ramney v. Meisenheimer, 61 Mo. App. 434, 439 (1919);
Crocker v. Barron, 234 S. W. 1032 (Mo. App., 1921); Cantan Provision
Co. v. Gareder, 120 Ohio St. Rep. 43, 196 N. E. 634 (1935); Beyer v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 75 S. W. (2d) 642 (Mo. App. 1934); Walters v. U.
Grocery Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473 (1918). But see for the majority
view, Dothan Chero Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 So.
734 (1918); Walden v. Wheeler, 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W. 1088 (1913);
Trafton v. Davis, 110 Me. 318, 86 Atl. 179 (1913); Scruggins v. Jones, 207
Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743, (1925).
86. Williston, Necessity of the Privity of Contract in Warranties (1928)
42 Harv. L. Rev. 414; Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743
(1925).
87. Walter v. U. Grocery Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473 (1918) (dealer
was liable and not the manufacturer).
88. Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 337, 144 Pac. 202 (1914).
89. Supra, note 88 at 337.
90. Supra, note 88 at 337.
1937] NOTES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/14
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
Sasaki9l the court said that the plaintiff could not recover for
negligence since the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
was to the original purchaser only. In Davis v. Van Camp Pack-
ing Co.92 the court said that the manufacturer was liable, regard-
less of privity of contract, on an implied warranty and concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question
whether the defendant had rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie
case of negligence. In Hertzler v. Manshum 3 the court decided
that the warranty existed, but that if the manufacturer could
show that he had exercised the highest degree of care the plain-
tiff would be without remedy. The Alabama courts have con-
fused tort and warranty, as is shown by the case of Dothan
Chero Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks,94 where the court held
that the law implies the manufacturer has warranted goods as
fit for use and requires that he exercise a degree of care ordina-
rily exercised by persons in the particular business. However, in
Collen Baking Co. v. Savage"5 the Alabama Court held that a
defense of contributory negligence is not a defense to a warranty
action.
The case of Ketterer v. Armour" must be put into a class by
itself. The court in that case says that the remedies of the con-
sumer ought not be made to depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales and that the obligation of the manufacturer should
not rest upon privity of contract. The court asserted that the
liability of a manufacturer is demanded by social justice and that
if there could be found no authority for the proposition of liabil-
ity it was high time there be one.
C. Criticism of the Privity of Contract Concept.
The privity of contract requirement has resulted in great re-
striction of the action of warranty. "Only by a violent pounding
and twisting can the concept of implied warranty be made to
yield the result called for by economic and social conditions. '9 7
The privity doctrine has been severely criticised by Williston on
91. Binion v. Sasaki, 41 P. (2d) 585 (Cal., 1935).
92. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920).
93. Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924). To the
same effect see Goldman & Friedman Bottling Co. v. Sindall, 140 Md. 488,
117 Atl. 866 (1922).
94. Supra, note 68.
95. Supra, note 68. The Collen case straightened out the Week ease and
said that there should be no implied warranty and there should only exist
tort liability.
96. Ketterer v. Armour, 200 Fed. 322, 323 (D. C. N. Y. 1912).
97. Note, 24 Col. L. Rev. 335, 357 (1924).
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the ground that in its origin warranty was a tort action.9 8 The
Uniform Sales Act99 fails to provide expressly for implied war-
ranty between consumer and manufacturer. This is a distinct
shortcoming of the Act. Failure to provide for such warranty
has hindered the extension of implied warranty because of the
belief that the Act was intended to crystallize the common law.i O
But provision is made under section 12 that any affirmation of
fact or promise which relates to the goods and which induces the
purchaser to buy has the effect of an express warranty.
D. Search for a New Theory
Under a recent actual survey,1 0' it was found that the actual
practice among manufacturers and dealers with regard to the
operation of the manufacturer's warranty against defects was
that complaints are adjusted by the manufacturer directly or
through the agency of the dealer. The manufacturer assumes
that he is directly liable to the consumer. If the manufacturer
settles with the consumer through the dealer it is for the sake of
convenience, and the dealer is merely an agent. The dealer does
not regard himself as having any personal responsibility. All
parties regard him as a conduit or intermediary for adjustment
purposes, even though he has warranted the goods and sold them
as his own. These facts manifest a practical repudiation by the
manufacturer and the dealer of the legalistic notion that war-
ranties should be effective only as between parties in privity of
contract. Business practice seems to be in accord with the minor-
ity of the courts. The introduction of the middleman into the
chain of distribution has been allowed to affect substantive
rights. 102 Hindered by legal concepts of privity the courts and
commentators have tried to work out theories to cover the prob-
98. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 244a. A warranty may be im-
posed by the parties or by law contrary to their intention. In its origin
the warranty was a tort and it should be considered as a hybrid between
a tort and a contract. See Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation
(1910) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, where he considers a mere representation
sufficient to allow a party to sue the manufacturer on the warranty theory.
99. U. S. A. (1906) sec. 12, 15.
100. Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 868 (1933); In Prinsen v. Russos, 215 N. W.
905 (Wis. 1907), the court said that no warranty existed since the U. S. A.
raised only an implied warranty between the buyer and the seller, and the
word buyer and seller denoted and showed an obligation to be created by
contract as distinguished from those implied by law.
101. Bogart & Fink, Warranties in Sales (1930), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400,
416.
102. Williston, Necessity of Privity of Contract in Warranties (1928)
42 Ham'. L. Rev. 414.
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lems of modern marketing. These theories contended to get
around the most insuperable difficulty of privity of contract °3
In order to provide a legal theory to fit the trade practices
of today some writers assert that an express contract may be
established between the manufacturer and the consumer. They
treat the representations of the manufacturer as a general offer
on his part, accepted by the ultimate consumer when he pur-
chases the article from the retail dealer.104 Such a contract is
a unilateral contract under Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.1°0
However imposing this theory may be, the courts are not likely
to adopt it, as no intention to contract is present.100
The theory of express warranty through the medium of ad-
vertising has been advanced but rejected by the courts. They
may hold that there is an express warranty between the dealer
and the purchaser as in the case of Baumgartner v. Glisner,07
where the seller advertised that 95% of his corn seed had germi-
nated and, relying on the representation, a farmer purchased the
seed, such was considered an express warranty. But when the
problem arises between subpurchaser and the manufacturer, the
courts are reluctant to find an express warranty. In Davis v. Van
Camp'08 a label on a can of pork and beans stated that the meat
had been inspected by federal inspectors and that the contents
were ready for the table. There was, however, held to be no
express warranty. In Pelletier v. Du Pontoo it was decided that
printed matter on a bread wrapper that the bread was pure, nu-
tritious and clean could not be considered as an express warranty
of general fitness for human consumption. The court said that
103. Milton and Handler, False Advertising (1929) 39 Yale L. J. 22,
25, which was written before the Baxter case yet considered express war-
ranty under section 12 of the U. S. A.
104. See comment, 2 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 330, 331 (1928); Note, 16 Corn.
L. Q. 610, 615 (1930), which says that a direct contractual relationship
with the manufacturer might be established on the ground that the me-
chanics of advertising such as labels, etc. can be considered as an offer
by the manufacturer and the purchaser accepting the offer by purchasing
the goods; 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 244a.
105. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q. B. 256 (1893).
106. Note, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351 (1932) The criticism of this is that
neither party intended to enter into the contract.
107. Baumgartner v. Glissner, 171 Minn. 289, 214 N. W. 27 (1927);
but see Cool v. Fighter, 239 Mich. 42, 214 N. W. 162 (1927); where a
circular letter was sent out saying that a radio set would receive across
the continent, which was not considered as an express warranty. See cases
collected in Note, 32 A. L. R. 1215 (1924).
108. Davis v. Van Camp. Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382
(1920).
109. Pelletier v. Du Pont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1934).
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the statements related to the ingredients only, and did not war-
rant that there would not be foreign substances in the bread.
The Baxter case"0o was hailed by many critics as a landmark
in the law of sales. At last a court had recognized advertising
as a medium through which an express warranty could be
made.' The rule of the case would seem to be that statements
concerning the manufacturer's product contained in his adver-
tisements are express warranties to the consumer.112 It was in-
deed an innovation, for the case was not a food case.
However, the exact holding of the Baxter case is questionable.
Among law review writers there is doubt as to whether it is
a case of deceit," 3 a case falling within Mac Pherson v. Buick,114
a case based on implied warranty,"5 a decision on the unilateral
contract theory of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.,"" or a tort
on warranty action." 7
An examination of the Baxter case shows there were only two
decisions cited in the body of the opinion. The court first relied
on Mazetti v. Armnour,"5 a food case. The court in that case
had said: 1 9
"The manufacturer is liable for implied warranty when
the goods are dispensed in the original package. The manu-
facturer is not liable to any other person than his immediate
vendee and without privity of contract no suit can be main-
tained. An exception to the rule will be declared when the
case is not an isolated instance and does not square with
justice."
110. Baxter v. Ford Motor Car Co., 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932), where the
suit was against the manufacturer for a broken windshield. Plaintiff pur-
chased the car from a retail dealer and the car was manufactured by the
defendant and represented in a catalogue furnished by the dealer as having
shatterproof glass. Plaintiff was injured when a pebble struck the wind-
shield and the plaintiff lost his eye from the flying glass and the manu-
facturer was held liable.
111. Bogart and Britton, Cases on Sales (1936) 749, classifies the Baxter
case under express warranties; Note, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 352 (1932);
Note, 18 Corn. L. Rev. 487 (1932); Comment, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1932).
112. Note, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 352 (1932).
113. Note, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 94 (1932), which puts this case in the
deceit theory and thus claims that it is not a departure from-the law. See
also 88 A. L. R. 527, which classifies the Baxter case with Graham v. John
R. Watts, supra, note 33 which was a deceit case.
114. Note, 18 Corn. L. Q. 487 (1932); Note, 7 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 221
(1934); Note, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 94 (1932).
115. Note, 18 Corn. L. Q. 487 (1932).
116. Note, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 353 (1932).
117. Note, 18 Corn. L. Q. 487 (1932).
118. Mazetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.)
213 (1913).
119. Ibid. at 634.
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But the Mazetti case had gone further to say that the test of
liability is based on the breach of duty on the part of the one
who had the power to prevent the wrong. It would seem the
Mazetti case is an implied warranty case with confused negli-
gence terms.
The Baxter case goes on to cite Thomas v. Winchester 120 say-
ing the purchaser in the Baxter case was in a position similar
to the purchaser of labelled drugs who had relied upon the manu-
facturer's representations that the label correctly set forth the
contents of the container.' 12 But the Baxter decision further
,discusses the changes in society since the development of the
rule of caveat emptor, recognizing that radio, newspapers, and
billboards are the great means of creating the demands of the
ultimate consumer. The court concludes that it would be unjust
to recognize a rule that would permit a manufacturer of goods
to create a demand for them by representing that they possess
qualities which they do not possess in fact, and, then deny the
consumer the right to recover. The court submits the case to
the jury to determine whether the defect was the immediate
cause of the injury. The writer of this note feels that the action
was one of negligent advertising. 22
Not only have the law review writers been confused but the
courts display equal confusion as to the holding of the Baxter
case. In E. L DuPont de Nemours v. Baridon123 the court cited
the Baxter case as allowing recovery for negligence under Mac
Pherson v. Buick. The court in Bird v. Ford Motor Car Co.1
24
-also cited the Baxter case on the negligence proposition of the
Mac Pherson case. In Calonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.2 21 the Bax-
ter case was cited for the proposition that a warranty runs with
a chattel.
In Channin v. Chevrolet Motor Co.12 6 the plaintiff was induced
to buy a car on the representation that the windshield was shat-
120. Supra, note 8.
121. Auto was represented as having a windshield of non-shatterable
,glass "so made that it will not fly or shatter under the hardest impact."
An ordinary person would be unable to determine by the usual and cus-
tomary examination of the auto whether the glass would fly or shatter.
122. Supra, notes 26 to 31.
123. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Baridon, 73 F. (2d) 28, (C. C. A. 8,
1934).
124. Bird v. Ford Motor Car Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (D. C. N. D. N. Y.,
196).1936).
125. Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy, 186 S. E. 94, 98 (W. Va., 1936).
126. Channin v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 15 Fed. Supp. 57 (D. C. N. C.
111, 1935).
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terproof. The plaintiff brought suit on the theory of the Baxter
case relying on an express warranty. The court held,12 7 "That in
no case except the Baxter case has it been held that any other
than the vendor is liable for the misrepresentations except in an
action of deceit." And the court states that warranty under
the Uniform Sales Act is limited to actions between the vendor
and the vendee. It is not the function of the court, but rather the
function of the legislature to require that the manufacturer make
good his representations and until such is done, "I as judge will
not undertake to change a rule which has been laid down by
all the courts with the single exception of the Baxter case.12
F. Conclusion
Extension of the doctrine of express warranty is the solution
to the problems raised by modern day advertising. The protec-
tion of the consumer through shifting of the risk to the manu-
facturer, who is best able to bear it, should be affected by this
means. Criticism of the many decisions would be futile. Legis-
lative action would be the most effective way to bring about a
result which is in accord with our complex society and actual
practice.129
It would seem that a simple definition of the word vendor
would solve the problem for those states which have adopted the
Uniform Sales Act. The courts have felt that failure to use the
word "manufacturer" in the Sales Act shows an intent of the
legislators to exclude the liability of the manufacturer. 30 By a
simple definition of the word vendor the solution could be met.
Thus if the word vendor were defined to include manufacturer
the courts without difficulty could find an express warranty, and
the doctrine of privity would be satisfied. In those states which
do not have the Uniform Sales Act a statute copying section 12
of the present Act with a definition of vendor which would in-
clude the manufacturer would attain the same result.
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supra, note 37.
130. Channin v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 15 F. Supp. 57 (D. C. N. D.
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